In our previous three posts here, here, and here, we have gone through a brief summary of Leibniz’ Cosmological Argument. And of course, many objections are likely to arise, mostly from misunderstandings of the argument. Here I would like to briefly respond to some of those common objections.
What if the universe had no beginning?
You’ve got this argument confused with another argument. My argument says nothing about the universe as a whole, and only needs one contingent object to succeed. My argument also says nothing about anything “beginning”. This argument would work just fine if the universe had no beginning.
What explains God?
The way we have used the word “God” is by meaning “The non-contingent object”. But given our definition for contingent, this means “The object that does explain itself”. So if you ask “What explains God?”, you are asking “What explains the thing that explains itself?”. The answer is obvious: God does.
How do you know there are contingent things?
Consider a simple fact: things fall down. The first scientists asked: why do things fall down? They needed an explanation. The fact that things fell down wasn’t self-explanatory. And they found an answer, coming up with a theory of gravity. But then again: why do things have mass? The fact that things have mass requires and demands an explanation. It is contingent. And we built the Large Hadron Collider looking for that explanation.
You’re just defining God into existence!
What I am doing is inferring the existence of something by looking at the effects it has. For example, I might look at a clock and infer the existence of a motor behind the arms, because it is making those arms move. Am I defining the motor into existence by doing this? No I am not.
This only proves a deist God, not the Christian God!
True, this is not a sufficient argument for Christianity. It gets us to theism, but we need further arguments to get to Christianity. But it’s a step in the right direction, ruling out atheism.
This is a God of the gaps argument!
What I am doing is inferring the existence of something by looking at the effects it has. A God of the gaps argument goes something like “We can’t explain this thing, therefore God did it”. I am not doing that at all. Instead, what I’m doing is arguing that God is the only possible explanation for something. Suppose I have a car that works. Am I right in inferring the existence of a motor inside the car? Is that a motor of the gaps argument? No.
Believing the PSR commits us to denying libertarian free will/accepting necessitarianism
This doesn’t bother me much, since I am a Calvinist and therefore a compatibilist, and I am a modal necessitarian. However I do need to maintain that God is totally free, so I have to engage with it to some degree. A good argument can be found here, it is reasonably well explained and I will not reproduce it.
We should only believe things we can test, how did you test this?
I reject the claim that we must test every claim. I only think we should test scientific claims. If you can test this, go ahead, but I think it is fundamentally impossible. Just like it’s fundamentally impossible to test whether the square root of two is irrational. But that doesn’t mean the proofs that the square root of two is irrational fail, nor does it mean that Leibniz’ cosmological argument fails. The simple fact is that logic works, and we can use deductive logic to work out truths from true premises. If you think my premises are false, or my arguments for why they are true fail, then feel free to tell me why. But if you think my premises are true, then you must accept the conclusion, it’s the result of simple and easy to follow logic.
The necessary thing is the universe/big bang/laws of physics
That’s a reasonable suspicion when we get up to (4), but falls flat after (5). We not only prove that there is a necessary object, but we prove that it has all the properties we normally think of God as having. And none of the suggestions above for the necessary object have these properties. We cannot merely attach the description “necessary” to whatever we please, we must discuss what properties the necessary thing must have.
The PSR is almost true, there’s only one brute fact: The BCCF
This is a common objection. We can get all the benefits of the PSR, without being forced into accepting God. But it has some unfortunate implications. Consider a weakened PSR: every fact possibly has an explanation. It turns out that this is sufficient to prove God. Suppose the BCCF is possibly explained. If it is explained, it’s explained by a necessary God (as we have already shown). So possibly a necessary God exists. But by S5 modal logic, this means God exists. So the objection is no good. Instead, the objector has to say that necessarily the BCCF has no explanation. Now first, it seems to me that if a fact necessarily has a property, that fact is necessarily true. But further, it is a hard burden to take onto yourself to say that the BCCF is necessarily unexplained. The one who claims that it is necessarily unexplained must give a coherent and non-arbitrary reason why it is necessarily unexplained. No such reason has yet appeared.