Another argument for the PSR

The PSR is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the most controversial premise of the LCA which we have defended here previously. We will here provide another argument for the PSR. That is, for the claim that for every contingent thing (or perhaps indeed every single thing, contingent or not) has a sufficient explanation.

The argument I intend to motivate is this: we should extend reasoning principles as far as possible, until we have a good reason. The PSR is a principle we use in many areas, and so we should extend it to all objects unless we can come up with a good reason why we should not.

Now we all know how we apply the PSR in physical situations. There is currently light hitting my eye, as an explanation I posit a computer monitor in front of me as an explanation. An apple falls from a tree, and we posit gravity. Celestial objects move across the sky, and we posit heliocentrism. In none of these cases do we say “perhaps there’s no explanation”, we always immediately begin looking for one. If there’s some phenomenon we can’t find an explanation for, we conclude that we aren’t smart enough, or our equipment isn’t precise enough. We assume that there is one we just haven’t found.

So now we might be tempted to say “The PSR only applies to physical phenomena”, and then we wouldn’t be forced to admit that God exists. And there may be some cause for this since intuitively, physical objects are the kinds of things which seem like they’re causally closed. But maybe other kinds of phenomena (if they exist at all) are “spooky” and not causally closed, so maybe there’s no PSR there.

Let’s consider another domain then: ethics. Take the famous trolly problem: suppose it turned out to be the case that it was morally wrong to pull the lever to save five while condemning one. Suppose this was morally impermissible. And an interested interlocutor would ask “Why?” Suppose we answered, “It just is, there’s no reason”. Is that an acceptable answer? Clearly not. And in fact many ethicists have spent their lifetimes looking for answers to such ethical question: what is right and what is wrong, and why are those things right and wrong. Again, there is the presumption of explanation.

Now a third domain: mathematics. We observe some mathematical phenomenon, and we ask “why”. That “why” often comes in the form of a proof, or at least a sketch of a proof. Often the “why” is actually hidden in the proof, almost as if the author of the proof went to great effort to obscure the deep intuition. But sometimes it’s on the surface. And this doesn’t only apply to theorems, we can ask why a theorem is true, but we can also ask why something more general is the case. Here’s one such question: why does the sum of the series of inverse square numbers involve a pi term? Pi has to do with circles, but this doesn’t appear to be related to circles. And indeed, there is an explanation.  This kind of question is often asked by mathematicians, why is something the case? And often the answer is intuitively satisfying, deep, and can lead to new ways of thinking about problems. Much of mathematics, rather than hunting for proofs of theorems, is hunting for these more intuitive, conceptual explanations of a more general class of phenomena.

Now we go back to our PSR. It holds in the domains of physics, ethics, and mathematics. Our natural, everyday reasoning assumes that the PSR holds when we consider physical objects, abstract objects (such as numbers), and moral facts. So how might we restrict it? If we say “All physical, ethical, and mathematical phenomena have sufficient explanations”, but that seems extremely arbitrary. And again, we normally want to expand principles until we have a good reason not to. What good reason do we have for restricting the PSR to these classes of phenomena, but not others?

And we can take this argument even further. We can follow Della Rocca, and point out that unless you can give a sufficient reason for that restriction, you’ve begged the question. I covered that particular argument in the original post on the PSR, but it is worth reiterating because I think it is indeed a strong one.



Saturday Links 25/8/18


Sorry posts have been a bit sparse lately, I have just started a full time (secular) job. I still need to work out how I am going to manage my time between all of my projects.

Biblical Justification for Classical Arguments

Since I am Reformed, I have often been criticised for my use of classical apologetics such as Cosmological Arguments on the basis that it has an unbiblical anthropology. The presuppositionalist claims that we shouldn’t grant the ground to the atheist that they can use reason, since reason is grounded in God and depends on God. Under their worldview, there is no God, so there is no justification for why they can use reason.

Further, claims the presuppositionalist, by doing this we allow man to sit in judgement over God. Man gets to weigh the evidence, and then use their reason (for which they depend on God) to judge whether God is God or not, whether God exists or not. But in reality, God is the judge, and we have no authority over Him.

I think there is some merit to this, but I do not think this disqualifies classical arguments. And indeed, I think there is biblical precedent for these arguments and a place for them in apologetic practice.

First and most obviously, we appeal to Romans 1. Here is the section I have in mind (please read the context yourself):

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness,19 because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them. 20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse. 21 For even though they knew God, they did not honor Him as God or give thanks, but they became futile in their speculations, and their foolish heart was darkened. 22 Professing to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the form of corruptible man and of birds and four-footed animals and crawling creatures.

24 Therefore God gave them over in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, so that their bodies would be dishonored among them. 25 For they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.

Why are men without excuse? Because knowledge of God was freely available to them: His eternal power and divine nature are displayed in creation. But they did not approve of having God in their knowledge, so they suppress the truth and their foolish hearts were darkened.

This affirms what cosmological arguments claim: that we can look at the world, and reason about it, and deduce that there is a God. This also applies to fine-tuning arguments. Paul affirms that this kind of reasoning (though not individual arguments, just the kind of reasoning) is valid, and in fact, people are morally guilty for failing to accept the conclusions of this kind of reasoning.

Now the presuppositionalist claims that yes, this is the case. But their foolish hearts were darkened, and they cannot see this any longer, as they suppress the truth in unrighteousness. The only thing that can undarken their hearts is God regenerating them, the hearing of the Gospel, and faith in God.

I agree. And I think that no apologetic encounter is complete without the Gospel, and in fact, the proclamation of the Gospel must always be central. Don’t get me wrong, if you walk up to someone, run them through the LCA, and leave, you’ve done them basically no good.

But I don’t think that means that cosmological arguments do no good. Part of the proclamation of the Gospel is that there is a God, there is a Designer and a Judge, and we have failed to live up to His standards. And if we must justify that claim, we will, and we will use cosmological arguments as part of that justification.

And of course, no-one will listen unless God regenerates their heart. But if God does regenerate their heart, as is His prerogative, then cosmological arguments which demonstrate to their mind the truth of God can be an effective part of Gospel witness. And if He doesn’t, then they expose inconsistency. More on that later.

The second main point I want to make is this. The presuppositionalist says that the atheist has no ground for using reason without appealing to God, no reason to believe that reason is reliable apart from God. I want to point out that that is precisely the same way cosmological arguments proceed, but in reverse. The presuppositionalist claims “Reason is reliable only if God exists”, and the classical apologist claims “If reason is reliable, God exists”. These two statements are logically equivalent. For we assume reason and conclude God, so reason entails God. And so when the atheist says they can use reason but have no God, then if the classical arguments are sound, we can say that they are inconsistent.

And notice that no matter which path we take, classical or presuppositional, we must appeal to reason at some point. If we do present a convincing argument that reason is grounded in God, the atheist must use reason to accept the argument. We both assume they are able to reason, even if they don’t have a sufficient ground for it.

Now it is true that discussions cosmological arguments can often get lost in what we might call meaningless minutia, and we lose our focus on God. But I submit that not only is this true for any kind of argument, but also that it isn’t a huge problem. While every conversation we have must have Christ at the centre, not every sentence needs to. Clearly, in negative apologetics, we know this, when we respond to a supposed contradiction in the Old Testament we normally don’t talk much about Christ in that particular subpoint.<

We also see from Paul at Mars Hill that it is valid to in a sense “enter into” someone else’s worldview in order to preach the Gospel. Paul begins his evangelistic and apologetic work at Mars Hill by appealing to a god the Athenians worshipped, the unknown God. He identifies this god with God, claiming that this God created the universe and everything in it. He then quotes parts of some works describing Zeus and attributes them to God. Paul enters into their worldview to make a point, to demonstrate the truth of God inside their worldview. Because of course, we know that any worldview without God is inconsistent. So if we enter their worldview and pretend that it is consistent, we ought to be able to prove God exists. This is what cosmological arguments do: let’s enter into the atheistic worldview, pretend that we can reason, and deduce that God exists.

But as we saw above, the dark-hearted fools who are unregenerate won’t accept it. More often than not, they admit they have no response to the argument, but retreat to “Well sure maybe God exists. But if He does, He is a moral monster and is evil and I would never worship Him.” And this is the appropriate place to quote Romans 9: “And who are you, O man, to answer back to God?”. We affirm, like our concerned presuppositionalist does above, that God is the judge and we are not. We point out their pride and wrong-headedness in sitting in judgement over God.

They pretend their disagreement with God is intellectual, not moral. But we know from our study of Romans 1 that it is indeed moral. Cut away their intellectual pretence, and they are forced to admit the truth. This is where we cut to the heart: man placing Himself above God. And if God grants them a regenerated heart to see this and repent, then they can turn and be saved.

This is why I think cosmological arguments, and other classical arguments, are valuable. Never do they comprise the entirety of our apologetic preaching or methodology, but they are valuable components. Paul affirms their soundness in Romans and applies a similar methodology (to Pagans rather than atheists) at Mars Hill. Not the only valuable arguments, but good ones to have in our bag when the need arises.

Saturday Links 18/8/18

Apologetics Resource: Capturing Christianity

I have recently come across a nice apologetics website called Capturing Christianity. Their mission and methodology are quite similar to mine, though they are clearly a good deal more professional (since they actually get paid for it). They have produced some good content. Especially on their youtube channel, since as you are probably aware most apologetics on youtube is garbage. Worth checking out.

The Prophecy of Daniel 9

A strong argument for the truth of the Bible is biblical prophecy. That is, if the Bible contains accurate, specific information about the future, the claims it makes about God are more likely to be true. Whether or not the prophecy actually means God exists may be debatable (maybe it was just time travelling aliens) and that’s a bit beyond what I want to do here. I want to examine one such interesting prophecy, and determine whether it was specific and whether it was fulfilled.

This is a strange kind of argument for me, I spend most of my time on cosmological or teleological or moral arguments. Even historical evidence that Jesus rose from the dead. However I do think that this is valuable, so bear with me as I give it a go.

This kind of argument often makes people nervous because of the stereotype about prophecy arguments, especially ones that contain the dreaded numbers and dates like this one will. I understand and agree that normally this stereotype is deserved. However, I will make every attempt to perform responsible exegesis and make a rational argument. I ask that you don’t write the argument off immediately, and instead actually evaluate it on its own merits.

The text we will be examining is this one from Daniel 9, starting at verse 24. It is a message that the angel Gabriel brings to Daniel, who is lamenting the state of Israel. Please do read the context yourself. Here is the NASB:

24 “Seventy weeks have been decreed for your people and your holy city, to finish the transgression, to make an end of sin, to make atonement for iniquity, to bring in everlasting righteousness, to seal up vision and prophecy and to anoint the most holy place. 25 So you are to know and discern that from the issuing of a decree to restore and rebuild Jerusalem until Messiah the Prince there will be seven weeks and sixty-two weeks; it will be built again, with plaza and moat, even in times of distress. 26 Then after the sixty-two weeks the Messiah will be cut off and have nothing, and the people of the prince who is to come will destroy the city and the sanctuary. And its end will come with a flood; even to the end there will be war; desolations are determined.27 And he will make a firm covenant with the many for one week, but in the middle of the week he will put a stop to sacrifice and grain offering; and on the wing of abominations will come one who makes desolate, even until a complete destruction, one that is decreed, is poured out on the one who makes desolate.”

I summarize the prophecy in this way:


  • The command to restore Jerusalem is given.
  • Seven sevens pass.
  • Sixty-two sevens pass. The anointed one comes. The city will be rebuilt. Sometime after the sixty-two sevens, the Anointed One will be put to death and have nothing.
  • The people of “the prince to come” will destroy the city and the temple, and desolation will continue until the end.
  • Durin the seventieth seven: “He” will confirm a covenant with many.
  • Halfway through the seventieth seven: “He” will put an end to sacrifice and offering.
  • After (or perhaps at) the seventieth seven: On the wing of abominations, one comes who makes desolate, and he will be destroyed. This probably refers to the people of the “prince to come”.
  • After seventy sevens: Transgression is finished, sin comes to an end, wickedness is atoned for, everlasting righteousness is brought in, prophecy and vision are sealed up, the “Most Holy” is anointed.


The “sevens” are groups of seven years, not weeks

We note that the passage literally only says “seven sevens” and “seventy sevens” and “sixty-two sevens”, at no point does it indicate that these are weeks. Now the word for “sevens” and “weeks” in Hebrew is the same, for obvious reasons. Some translators have chosen in this passage to render it as “weeks” instead of “sevens”, but there is no indication in the text that it refers to days.

Similar extra-biblical prophecies also use the “week of years” concept, for example with the Dead Sea Scroll 4Q390 fragment 2.

In light of the 70 years in v2, it seems reasonable that this also refers to a period of years. The context indicates that we should be thinking in years, not in weeks.


This prophecy was written far before Jesus came

While I am a Christian and I hold to the traditional position that the entire book was written by Daniel at around 600 BCE, I will deliberately make my argument weaker here. I will assume that it was written far later than that. I will assume that the most critical and the most sceptical scholars are right. Again, I don’t actually think they are, but I will assume this because I don’t want to bother refuting them here, I don’t need to. The latest date they give for the book is 164 BCE[1]. This is still over a century earlier than Jesus would come.


The starting date of the seven and sixty-two sevens is 457 BCE

This is when the order goes out from Artaxerxes 1. This is a decree given to Ezra, this is also recorded in scripture that was written before Christ. The exact date of the decree is given in the book of Ezra, but we will just consider the year (rather than month and date) because I don’t want to mess around with complicated Jewish leap year rules, and because there is probably some measure of approximation going on anyway.


The seven and sixty-two sevens come to an end at 27 CE

We start with -457, and we add (69)x(7) years, and then we add one because there is no year 0. It’s not obvious what is supposed to happen after the first set of sevens, that is, after 49 years. It may be divided for reasons of numerology (7 is of course a very symbolic number in Hebrew thought) or it may indicate when the completion of the restoration of Jerusalem will occur. Or perhaps something else that I haven’t thought of, or that history in general is unaware of.


This indicates that Jesus is the Messiah spoken of in the passage

One of the things the prophecy predicts is the anointing of the “Most Holy”. The translators add the word “place” as they argue that it is implied since the “most holy” normally refers to the temple. (But this isn’t actually true, it refers to the temple sometimes but not even the majority of the time). But given that Jesus is the most holy, and that Jesus compares His body to the temple in several places, I think we can reasonably say that this is actually fulfilled in Jesus.

Historians think Jesus’ baptism occurred between 27 and 29. We are certainly in that range. Jesus’ baptism is an extremely significant event recorded in all Gospels, marking the start of His public ministry. This is when Jesus appeared in history.

Then halfway through the last week, there is desolation, and the Messiah is cut ofg. This puts Jesus’ death 3.5 years (probably approximate, but we will use this figure) after 27, which is 30.5.

Historians believe Jesus was crucified between 30 and 36 CE. We are again in that range.

And of course, Christians claim that Jesus’ death brings an end to sin and wickedness by atoning for it, and marks the end of the age of prophecy as Jesus gives God’s fullest and final revelation. See Hebrews 1. We also believe that Jesus instituted the New Covenant through His death and resurrection and that in doing so Jesus put a stop to the offerings and sacrifices at the temple. All of these things are specifically mentioned in the prophecy.

The events in Jesus’ life occur at the correct time, and they do the correct things. The most holy is anointed, sin is atoned for, the Messiah is cut off, a covenant is affirmed, sacrifice is brought to an end, and prophecy is brought to an end.


Who is the prince who is to come?

There are several options here. It seems clear that what he does is destroy the temple (see the similar language in chapter 11). This occurred in 70 AD, some time after the full 70 sevens of the prophecy are complete.

So the “prince” may refer to a particular Roman leader, perhaps the emperor at the time Vespatian. More likely is Titus who was the Roman commander at the siege of Jerusalem who would later become emperor. Or it may indeed be Satan. I leave this undetermined. I don’t know if we have enough information to determine who it is. There is evidence elsewhere in Daniel, but I will refrain from discussing it here. It doesn’t matter for the point I want to make.


The critical/skeptical interpretation fails

Many, many possible interpretations of this passage have been given by sceptical scholars. I won’t go through all of them in depth, but I will give some broad criticism. The most likely one is that the Messiah spoken of isn’t the Jewish Messiah spoken of elsewhere, but an anointed leader of the Jewish people. Most commonly, Onias III. He died outside Jerusalem in 171/0 BCE. If we take the latest possible date for Daniel, it was written around 164, around 6 years after his death, and so the skeptic argues that the author knew about this, and backdated a prophecy referring to it.

This doesn’t seem to work, however, as the timing doesn’t match up. There is no “word” that goes out 483 or 490 years before Onias’ death. So the skeptic arbitrarily picks a date earlier than this (often 606 BCE, when Jeremiah’s 70-year prophecy comes to an end), and says that the author of Daniel intended to use this as a starting point made a miscalculation in his dates. You can find examples of this in Montgomery (p393) and Porteous (p134). Alternatively, they try to fit it by allowing the sevens to overlap or have gaps between them. They’ve got a theory, and they want to fit the evidence to it, rather than letting the evidence inform their theory.

Apart from this, it is not clear how Onias III is supposed to have accomplished the goals set out at the start of the prophecy. He did not bring an end to wickedness and institute eternal righteousness.

Further, there was no destruction of the temple or of Jerusalem here. Yes, they were besieged and damaged, but not destroyed.

This methodology fails. The skeptic here rules out genuine prophecy a priori, and so has to look for a figure that fits this assumption. But no good candidates exist. And if we don’t rule out prophecy a priori, and we allow it to be possible (without even assuming that it happens), then we find a figure that clearly fits: Christ. We should start where the prophecy starts: at the word going out. We should look for that as the indication of the person that the passage is intending to talk about.


This prophecy is evidence for the supernatural origin of the Bible

I think that we can reasonably confidently say that if Daniel could accurately know precise details of the far future, this indicates that something supernatural was going on. I would be interested to see how the skeptic could agree that Daniel knew this, centuries before it happened, but didn’t do so supernaturally.


Further Reading





Saturday Links 11/8/18

Presuppositional Apologetics: One Helpful Approach Among Many

This is the title of a good post from the blog Reflections. Being Reformed, many people expect me to engage exclusively in presuppositional apologetics. Unfortunately for them, I am primarily interested in and gifted in more classical arguments such as cosmological arguments. And so I often get criticised on the basis of having an unbiblical anthropology, appealing to reason which the atheist has no ground or basis for.

I am however strongly convinced that scripture allows us to use other apologetic methodologies. Soon I intend to write a post explaining the biblical basis for using cosmological arguments. But until then, let this post from Reflections be the start of my explanation.

I respectfully think the standard presuppositionalist apologetics presentation is usually high on proclamation and rhetoric but sometimes low in terms of actual apologetic argument. Kelly James Clark notes this criticism in Five Views on Apologetics and I think there is merit to it. Thoughtful nonbelievers are not going to roll over and just admit that without God there is no possibility of having a coherent, morally viable, and existentially livable worldview. Don’t get me wrong: I think most of our worldview competitors do indeed have severe problems in explaining life’s most meaningful realities, but to say that all non-Christian worldviews are logically deficient needs to be demonstrated, not just proclaimed. In terms of philosophy, enduring aspects of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Kantianism don’t strike me as absurd, and they do have unique elements that don’t appear to be merely borrowed from Christianity.

For example, is it possible that Jews and Muslims could presume the truth of their faith based upon their claimed revelation from God? And could Judaism and Islam attempt to justify a transcendental argument from their revelatory perspective? I know Cornelius Van Til appeals to the concept of the one and the many to support the unique unity and diversity with the Trinity. I appreciate his intuition, but again, I would like to see this kind of discussion furthered—especially when it comes to these two important revelatory-based world religions.

I have heard presuppositional apologists say that there is an appropriate time to use evidences for the Christian faith, such as support for the resurrection of Jesus. But in practice, I think this is seldom done. So could arguments from classical and evidential apologetics provide helpful elements to presuppositionalism? And, if so, when?